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Defining Fraud as an Unprotected Category of
Speech: Why the Ninth Circuit Should Have Upheld
the Stolen Valor Act in United States v. Alvarez
I. INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Alvarez, Xavier Alvarez, having pled guilty to
charges ofviolating the Stolen Valor Act (SVA) by falsely claiming to
have received the Congressional Medal of Honor, appealed the issue
of the SVA's constitutionality to the Ninth Circuit. 1 Alvarez claimed
that under the First Amendment, the SVA was unconstitutional both
facially and as applied. 2 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Alvarez and
under strict-scrutiny review held that the SVA was unconstitutional
on its face and as applied to Alvarez. 3 Judge Bybee dissented and
argued that false statements of tact arc not protected under the First
Amendment, except in limited circumstances, and that this was not
one of those circumstances. 4 The Ninth Circuit declined to rehear
the case en banc; 5 however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 6
This Note agrees with the dissent that the SVA is constitutional
but does not address the validity of the dissent's argument that false
statements of fact are categorically unprotected speech. Rather, this
Note argues that the SVA is constitutional because it prohibits only
fraudulent misrepresentations, a recognized category of unprotected
speech. First, Part II of this Note provides an overview of the facts
and the Ninth Circuit opinion in United States v. Alvarez. Part III
then discusses the legal background of fraud law so as to determine
what characteristics the misrepresentations prohibited under the SVA
must have in order to qualifY as fraud. Finally, Part IV proposes a test
based on that legal background tor courts to usc in deciding whether
to classifY speech as fraudulent and then applies that test to the
misrepresentations prohibited under the SVA. Part V concludes.

I. United States v. Alvarez, 617 r.3d 1198, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.granted, 132
S. Ct. 457 (2011 ).
2. /d.atl201.
3. Id. at 1216-17.
4. Id. at 1218-21 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
5. United States v. Alvarez, 638 f.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2011).
6. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 457 (2011 ).
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II. UNITED STATES V.ALVAREZ
A. Facts and Procedural History
Alvarez was an elected member of the Three Valley Water
District Board of Directors in 2007. At a joint meeting with another
water-district board, Alvarez publicly introduced himself stating,
"I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in
1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got
wounded many times by the same guy. I'm still around." 7 With the
exception of the phrase, "I'm still around," everything that Alvarez
stated was nothing more than "a series of bizarre lies," as he has
never spent even a single day in any of the United States armed
forces. 8 The FBI obtained a recording of these misrepresentations
and charged Alvarez with violating the SVA, which prohibits people
from falsely representing themselves as having received congressional
military medals and honors. 9 Alvarez moved to dismiss the
indictment, claiming the SVA was unconstitutional as applied to him
and on its face. The United States District Court for the Central
District of California denied his motion and convicted him. Alvarez
appealed the constitutional issue. 10

B. Ninth Circuit Opinion
In the Ninth Circuit Alvarez opinion, the majority held that
because the SVA constitutes a content-based regulation of speech, it
should be subjected to strict scrutiny unless it fits into one of the
"well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem." 11 The majority specifically identified some
of these narrowly limited classes as "obscenity, defamation, fraud,

7. A!J,arez, 617 F.3d at 1200 (majority opinion).
8. !d. at 1200-01.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)-(c)(1) (2006) ("Whoever falsely represents himself or herselt~
\-crbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress
for the Armed Forces of the United States ... shall be tined under this title, imprisoned not
more than six months, or both... [And i]f a decoration or medal involved in [the]
offense ... is a Congressional Medal of Honor ... the offender shall be tined under this title,
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.").
10. Alvarez, 617 F3d at 1201.
11. !d. at 1202 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 ( 1942))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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incitement,
. speech integral to criminal conduct," "the lewd,"
"the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting words,"' 12
and rejected the dissent's main argument that the First Amendment
does not protect false statements of fact. 13
The dissent asserted that the Supreme Court has held false
representations of fact to be categorically unprotected. In support of
this assertion, the dissent cited various cases, particularly focusing on
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 14 where the Court held that,
false statements of tact . . . belong to that category of utterances
which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality." 15

However, the dissent acknowledged that there are some
exceptions to this general rule to "protect speech that matters" 16 and
give the First Amendment "breathing space," 17 but argued that those
exceptions do not apply in this case and that the majority has thus
"turned the exceptions into the rule and the rule into an
exception." 18
In rejecting the dissent's argument, the majority held that Gertz
(and the other cases cited by the dissent) simply illustrate that,
although all speech is presumptively protected whether true or false,
when false factual speech rises to the level of defamation, libel, fraud,
perjury, or speech integral to criminal conduct, it becomes
unprotected. 19 The majority claimed that in arguing otherwise, the

12. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010); Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 572) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id.atl206.
14. Id. at 1218 (Bybee,]., dissenting); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
( 1974) ("[ T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional
lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wideopen' debate on public issues.
[ T]he erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of
constitutional protection." (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964); Chaplirtsky, 315 U.S. at 572) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
15. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (quoting Chaplinsky 315 U.S. at 572).
16. Alvarez, 617 f.3d at 1219 (Bybee,]., dissenting).
17. Id.atl221.
18. Id.at1219.
19. See id. at 1205, 1207 (majority opinion) ("In defamation jurisprudence, the
question has never been simply whether the speech 'forfeits [first Amendment] protection by
the falsity of some of its factual statements.' The question is always whether the speech f(xfeits
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dissent took the statements about factual misrepresentations from
Gertz out of context. 20 Thus, the majority concluded that Alvarez's
false factual misrepresentations would be presumptively protected
and the SVA would be subject to strict scrutiny unless the
misrepresentations it prohibits rise to the level of defamation, fraud,
or speech integral to criminal conduct (as those are the only
unprotected categories of speech the majority thought could possibly
apply in this case ). 21 However, the majority only briefly mentioned
fraudulent speech and speech integral to criminal conduct and
instead focused almost exclusively on whether the speech in question
could be classified as defamatory, ultimately concluding that it could
not. 22
In its analysis of defamation and fraudulent speech, the majority
held that both categories of speech require an element of scienter23
and a showing of individualized or "bona fide" harm. 24 The majority
briefly discussed different types of fraudulent speech, such as perjury
and impersonation (though it did not specifically categorize these as
fraudulent speech), but found that the prohibited misrepresentations
at issue were not sufficiently similar to any of these types of speech to
qualifY as unprotected. 25 The majority reasoned that, unlike instances
of perjury and impersonation, misrepresentations about military
honors do not cause any bona tide harm or provide for the speakers,
at the cost of another, any benefit to which they arc not cntitled. 26
Mtcr concluding that the SVA prohibits misrepresentations that do
not qualifY as an unprotected category of speech, the majority
applied strict scrutiny to the Act and found that it was not narrowly
tailored to the government's compelling interest of "preserving the

its First Amendment protection as a result of its falsity 'and by its allelfed defamation of [the
plaintiff]."' (citation omitted)).
20. ld. at 1208 ("Unlike our dissenting colleague, we are not eager to extend a
statement (often quoted, but often qualified) made in the complicated area of defamation
jurisprudence into a new context in order to justit)• an unprecedented and vast exception to
First Amendment guarantees.").
21. Seeid.at121l.
22. See id.
23. Jd. at 1209. This Note uses a Supreme Court definition of "scienter" as "a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfclder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
24. Id. at 1211.
25. See id. at 1211-12.
26. ld.
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integrity of its system of honoring our military men and women for
their service and ... sacrifice. " 27
This case was considered for rehearing en bane, but rehearing
was denied in an opinion containing concurrences by Judge Smith
and Chief Judge Kozinski and dissents by Judge O'Scannlain and
Judge Gould. 28

III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has clearly established that fraud, as a
category, is unprotected by the First Amendment. In United States v.
Stevens, the Court said that "the First Amendment has 'permitted
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,' 29 •••
and [ t Jhese 'historic and traditional categories long familiar to the
bar ,' 30 includ[ e] ... fraud. " 31 Circuit courts and the Supreme Court
have defined fraud both narrowly and broadly, depending on
whether the definition was encompassing the entire category of fraud
or a specific type of fraud. For example, the Fifth Circuit has said,
speaking of the broad category of fraud, that it "needs no definition;
it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity." 32 Yet
that same circuit, when defining the tort of fraudulent inducement,
was much more specific, requiring "a material misrepresentation,
which was false, and which was either known to be false when made
or was asserted without knowledge of its truth, which was intended
to be acted upon, which was relied upon, and which caused
injury." 33 Similarly, the Supreme Court has defined fraud broadly
saying, "[ flraud connotes perjury, falsification, concealment, [and]
misrepresentation. " 34 But when speaking of a particular type of

27. Id. at 1216.
28. United States v. Alvarez, 638 F. 3d 666 (9th Cir. 20ll).
29. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,382-83 (1992)).
30. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. I 05, 127 ( 1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
31. Id. (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748,771 (1976)).
32. Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958) (quoting Weiss v.
United States, 122 F .2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
33. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Engin'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d
41, 47 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Meadows, 877 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex.
1994)).
34. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654,657 (1946).
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fraud, such as securities fraud, the Supreme Court has sometimes
been extremely specific, requiring many separate elements to be
met. 35
To determine which characteristics an action or representation
must have in order to fit within the category of fraud, it is necessary
to examine the requirements for various types of fraud to identifY any
overarching patterns or rules. Because the Supreme Court has said
that fraud encompasses "perjury, falsification, concealment, [and]
misrepresentation," 36 this section will discuss cases dealing with these
types of fraud as part of this brief overview of fraud law.

A. Elements of Fraud
One reason it is so difficult to strictly define fraud is that fraud is
most often applied in the courts as the enacting legislatures have
defined it. Although courts will often fill in the gaps with
common-law-fraud principles, when it is clear that the enacting
legislature intends to depart from the common law, the courts have
adopted that legislature's definition of and requirements for fraud
over the common law. 37 For example, in McNally v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that there was no mail fraud where people
had been deprived of their rights to "good government" because
preceding case law had commonly held that people could be
fraudulently deprived only of tangible property rights. 38 However,
after Congress amended the mail-fraud statute in response to
McNally to specifY that it was a crime to fraudulently deprive people
of the intangible right to honest services, the Court accepted that
definition of fraud and now prohibits fraudulent deprivations of

35. See, e.g., Stoncridge lnv. Partners, LLC v. Scientitlc-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
157 (2008) (requiring a plaintiff to prove "(I) a material misrepresentation or omission by the
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; ( 5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation").
36. Knauer, 328 U.S. at 657.
37. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010); see infra note 73; see also
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 476 (2006) (quoting Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 24 ( 1999)) (holding that "criminal fraud statutes '[do] not incorporate all of the
clements of common-law fraud"'; thus, elements of reliance normally required in common-law
fraud actions arc not required in cases of mail fraud because it would be inconsistent with the
statutes).
38. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1987), superseded by statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
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intangible rights (such as rights to honest government and honest
services) as well as tangible property rights. 39
Perjury is one type of fraud that has largely been defined by
legislatures, and courts have relied upon those definitions. The
Supreme Court, relying on the federal-criminal-perjury statute
(which "parallels typical state-law def!nitions of perjury" 40 ), has
defined perjury as false testimony under oath "concerning a material
matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than
as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory." 41 Moreover, the
government is not required to show that the perjury actually
impeded the investigation as long as the perjury was capable of doing
S0.42

Along with perjury, Congress has also prohibited other types of
misrepresentations that are likely to obstruct the justice system. In a
very far-reaching prohibition, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 prohibits anyone
"in any matter within the jurisdiction of ... the United States" from
"knowingly and willfully . . . mak[ing] any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations." 43 Because of its broad
language encompassing "any" false statement, this statute has been
interpreted to cover false statements "of whatever kind" in these
situations. 44 Expanding the reach of§ 1001 even further, the Court
rejected the argument that the statute
covers only those
misrepresentations that "pervert governmental functions" 45 but

39. See, eg., Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928 (holding that the legislature's addition of 18
U.S.C. § 1346 was meant to reject McNally, and thus the Court must accept that schemes to
deprive others of the intangible right of honest services qualifY as fraud).
40. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87,94 (1993).
41. Id (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006)).
42. See, eg., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398,400 (1998) (citing United States v.
Abrams, 568 F.2d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The government need not show that because of
the perjured testimony, the grand jury threw in the towel. Actual impediment of the
investigation is not required. . . All the law requires is that the witness' answers were capable
of int1ucncing the tribunal on the issue before it, including any matters collateral thereto.")).
The requirement that the misrepresentations be about "material" matters further ensures that
only misrepresentations that have the potential to cause harm are considered fraudulent. But
because this materiality requirement does not ensure that harm is actually caused, it seems clear
that harm need not actually be caused in order for misrepresentations to be fraudulent.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994), quoted in Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398,400
(1998).
44. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 400 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5
(1997)).
45. Id. at 402.
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maintained that even if such a requirement were implied it would
most likely always be met, at least in the context of criminal
investigations. The Court reasoned that "any falsehood relating to
the subject of the investigation perverts [a governmental] function"
because "investigation of wrongdoing is a proper governmental
function; and ... it is the very purpose of an investigation to uncover
the truth. " 46 Thus, this further illustrates that misrepresentations may
be fraudulent even without actually causing harm as long as there is a
potential to cause harm.
Within the broad category of misrepresentation, impersonation
could also be classified as fraud. Although most impersonation cases
deal with people who dress and act as someone else in order to
obtain benefits they are not entitled to, it is possible under many
impersonation statutes for someone to be punished based solely on
misrepresentations. 47 One prominent example of such a statute is the
federal-criminal-impersonation statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 912, which
makes it a crime to 1) falsely assume or pretend to be an officer or
employee acting under the authority of the United States and 2) act
as such or, in such pretended character, demand or obtain any
"money, paper, document, or thing of value." 48 This has been
applied in circumstances involving only verbal misrepresentations,
without any accompanying actions, and thus provides some insight
into what characteristics a misrepresentation must have in order to
qualifY as fraud. For example, in United States v. Ramos-Arenas the
Tenth Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction for impersonating a
government officer when he told a police officer that he was a

46. Id.
47. See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-2006 (2010); COLO. REv. STAT. A~N. § 185-113 (West 2011) ("A person commits criminal impersonation if he or she knowingly:
Assumes a false or fictitious identity or legal capacity, and in such identity or capacity he or
she: ... Confesses a judgment, or subscribes, verities, publishes, acknowledges, or proves a
written instrument which by law may be recorded, with the intent that the same may be
delivered as true; or ... [p ]ertorms any other act with intent to unlawtully gain a benefit for
himself~ herself, or another or to injure or detl·aud another."), cited in People v. Borrego, 738
P.2d 59, 60 (Colo. App. 1987) (holding that misrepresentations, such as giving a false address,
can quality as "any other act intending unlawtlJlly to gain a benefit."); W.VA. CODE A~N. §
61-1-9 (LexisNexis 2010), cited in Jordan v. Town of Pratt, 886 F. Supp. 555, 559 (S.D.W.
Va. 1995) ("The offense contours are thus straightforward: whenever one falsely represents
himself to be a law enforcement otticer with the intent to deceive another, that person has
violated the statute."); 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2006), cited in United States v. Ramos-Arenas, 596
F.3d 783,785 (lOth Cir. 2010).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 912.
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border-patrol agent, and the officer reduced his girlfriend's speeding
ticket to a warning. 49 The defendant in this case did not produce any
fake badge in pretending to be a border-patrol agent, but simply
stated that he was one and that his credentials were at his home. 50
The defendant argued that he had not obtained anything of value
from this misrepresentation and thus he could not be convicted
under the statute, but the court held that the forbearance of his
girlfriend's speeding ticket was something of value, regardless of
whether the defendant himself actually benefitted from it. 51
Moreover, the court said, " [ e ]ven if the statute were limited to the
false impersonator obtaining a thing of value for himself, the jury
could have found that Mr. Ramos did obtain something of value
from doing a favor for his girlfriend, if only in elevating his status in
her eyes. " 52 Thus, Ramos-Arenas demonstrates that purely verbal
misrepresentations in the context of impersonation may rise to a level
constituting fraud if the misrepresentations benefitted the speaker in
some way. 53
Overall, fraud tends to be regarded primarily as a tort "hedged
about with stringent requirements" rooted in the common law. 54
These requirements or elements of common-law fraud generally
include an intentional and material misrepresentation, made "for the
purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from action," which
does induce such action or inaction because the misrepresentation
was justifiably relied upon, that results in pecuniary loss. 55 But the
Supreme Court has established that not all common-law
requirements apply in statutorily created fraud actions. 56 So although
these requirements may still be relevant 57 to courts when

49. Ramos-Arenas, 596 F.3d at 785.
50. Jd.
51. Id. at 787-88.
52. Jd. at 788.
53. Note also that although some impersonation statutes, like the one at issue in RamosArenas, do not explicitly require a showing of harm, because false impersonation will likely
cause harm in the aggregate, this area of traud law, like perjury, still demonstrates an implicit
requirement that misrepresentations are only fraudulent if they could potentially cause harm.
54. SEC\'. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963) (quoting
HAROLD G. HANBURY & JiLL E. MARTIN, MODEll...'\; EQUIIT 643 (8th ed. 1962)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
55. See RESTATEME~T (SH~O:--.JD) 01' TORTS§ 525 ( 1977).
56. See, eg., sources cited supra note 37.
57. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 371 (1987) superseded by statute, 18
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determining whether an action qualifies as fraud, It IS clear that an
action may qualify as fraud even when not all of these elements are
present. 58

IV. ANALYSIS
Section A of this Part asserts that misrepresentations qualify as
fraud and are thus unprotected by the First Amendment when they
are made with the intent to deceive, and they have the potential to
effectuate some type of harm. Section B then applies this test to
misrepresentations about military honors, such as those made by
Alvarez, and concludes that such misrepresentations qualify as fraud
and are therefore unprotected by the First Amendment.

A. Fraud as a Category of Unprotected Speech
As explained above, the Supreme Court has clearly established
that the entire category of fraud is unprotected by the First
Amendment. 59 Therefore, the definition that is most important for
this analysis is the broad definition the Supreme Court has given for
the category of fraud in Knauer (rather than the definitions given tc>r
specific types of fraud), which is that "fraud connotes perjury,
falsification, concealment, [and] misrepresentation. " 60 However, this
definition is overbroad in the First Amendment context if taken on
its face-as it could arguably include misrepresentations that arc
accidental, negligent, theatrical, or satirical. Thus, to sufficiently
narrow this definition, it should be applied in tandem with the two
overarching principles that have traditionally been applied to all types
of fraud, which are that misrepresentations alone are fraudulent only
when they ( 1) are made with the intent to deceive 61 and (2) have the
potential to effectuate some type of harm. 62 Additionally, legislatures

U.S.C. § 1346 (2006); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. I, 23 (1999) ("Congress intends to
incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses."); sources cited mpra
note 37.
58. See, e._q., sources cited supra note 37.
59. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 771 ( 1976) ).
60. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 657 ( 1946).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993) (perjury requires
"willful intent"); Lord v. Goddard, 54 U.S. 198, 211 ( 1851) ("fraud means an intention to
deceive.").
62. See sources cited infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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and courts also occasionally require that the speaker receive or intend
to receive some benefit as a result of the deceptive speech. 63
However, in cases of statutory fraud, this seems to be a requirement
the courts only impose if the statute prohibiting the fraudulent act
imposes such a requirement. 64
It is clear that speech can only be fraudulent if the speakers
intended to deceive, but this intent can be presumed if it is shown
that the speakers knew their statements were false or knew they
lacked sufficient information to make such representations. 65 The
Federal Circuit defines the intent to deceive as "a state of mind
arising when a party acts with sufficient knowledge that what it is
saying is not so and consequently that the recipient of its saying will
be misled into thinking that the statement is true. " 66 When speakers
make false representations about information within their personal
knowledge-such as about themselves or their own intentions-it
can be presumed that those representations were made with
knowledge of their falsity and with the requisite intent to deceive
unless it is shown that the speaker mistakenly believed the statement
was true. 67

63. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2000) (prohibiting misrepresentations that result in the
obtaining of "money or property" within the context of security sales); CoLO. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 18·5·301 (West 2011) (person commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly "(m]akes a
false or misleading statement in any advertisement ... for the purpose of promoting the
purchase or sale of property or services"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.651 (West 2011)
(prohibiting misrepresentations that result in someone "claim[ing] a lottery prize"); see also
sources cited supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
64. See, elf., sources cited infra note 81 and accompanying text. It seems that it could
also be argued that all fraud statutes implicitly assume that speech is only fraudulent if it at least
has the potential to benefit the speaker. ror example, although perjury statutes do not require
any benefit to the speaker to be shown and the courts impose no such requirement, perjury in
general has the potential to benefit speakers, since they could use the deceptive speech to
protect themselves. See, eiJ., sources cited supra note 42 and accompanying text. Thus, it could
be implied that statutes arc only valid as prohibitions on fraud if they, like perjury statutes,
include this implicit requirement that the misrepresentations have the potential to benefit the
speaker. However, even if such a requirement were implied, this requirement would be met by
the SVA. See sources cited infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
65. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 r.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2010), reh'g en
/Jane denied, Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21187 (red. Cir. Sept. 15,
20 10) (citing Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (red. Cir. 2005)
("[ U]nder Clontech and under Supreme Court precedent, the combination of a false statement
and knowledge that the statement was false creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to
deceive the public"); Gary v. Jordan, 113 S.E.2d 730, 735 (S.C. 1960).
66. Clorttech, 406 r.3d at 1352.
67. Sa, C.Jf., id.; Gary, 113 S.E.2d at 735 ("[K]nowlcdge of the falsity of a
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Furthermore, speech can be classified as fraudulent only if the
speech has the potential to effectuate some harm. 6 x This requirement
is very important to the courts in distinguishing "between regulation
aimed at fraud," which is constitutional, and "regulation aimed at
something else in the hope that it would sweep fraud in during the
process," which is likely unconstitutional when regulating speech. 69
Because fraud is most often regarded (and invoked) as a tort/ 0 in
typical common-law fraud cases the courts will require that harm
actually be demonstrated in order to determine damages. 71 However,
contrary to the assumptions of the Alvarez majority, 72 this does not
necessarily hold true when the courts are dealing with different kinds
of statutory fraud. 73 In many circumstances, such as perjury, the
misrepresentations need only have the potential to effectuate some
harm to qualifY as fraudulent. 74 In other contexts, the courts may

representation is legally inferable where one makes it as of his personal knowledge .... ");
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.\'. Morairty, 178 f.2d 470, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1949) ("If it be
shown that the applicant made false statements concerning material f:1cts which tacts were of
such nature that they were presumably within the personal knowledge of the applicant, as
distinguished from mere statements of opinion, the insured is guilty of legal fraud whether or
not he intended to deceive the insurer."); Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Rubin, 73 f.2d
157, 165 (9th Cir. 1934) ("A presumption of intent to deceive is only raised when the
statements are made with knowledge of their falsity.").
68. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (requiring the obtaining or intent to obtain
"moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property" under the custody of a financial
institution for bank fraud); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 157 (2008) (requirement that economic loss be shown for securities fraud); United States
v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2000) (intent "to get money or property" as a wire
fraud requirement); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 187-88 ( 1924);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 ( 1977); sources cited supra notes 42-46 and
accompanying text.
69. Scc'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 969-70 ( 1984 ).
70. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 ( 1963)
(quoting HAROLD G. HANBURY & )ILL E. MARTIN, MODERN EQUITY 643 (8th ed. 1962))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of TORTS§ 531 ( 1977).
72. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 20 I 0), reh~q denied,
638 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.lfranted, 132 S. Ct. 457 (2011).
73. The Supreme Court has ruled that outside of"damage suit[s) berween parties to.
arm's-length transaction! s ]" proof of actual injury is not necessarily required. Capital Gains,
375 U.S. at 192 (1963).
74. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. See also mpra notes 43-45. Another
example of this principle can be seen in states like Louisiana, where it is a crime to make
misrepresentations during booking even if no harm is demonstrated. Misrepresentations such
as these can still be punished as fraudulent because they have the potential to cause harm, even
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imply that harm has been caused because the harm is either
intangible (and unquantifiable f 5 or only apparent in the aggregate. 76
This is because certain misrepresentations will almost always cause
harm, even if the harm is not readily apparent in each case. 77 Thus,
the legislature is permitted to prohibit those misrepresentations. 78
Most often, courts focus on the harm potentially brought by the
speaker, but occasionally the legislature prohibiting the fraudulent
misrepresentations also requires courts to establish that the
misrepresentations resulted in some benefit to the speaker. 79 This
requirement seems more apparent in areas of fraud where the harm
caused by the fraud is less likely to be identifiable in individual cases.
For example, in the false impersonation context, most statutes
require the courts to show that the speaker gained some benefit
because of the misrepresentations, though such benefit need not be
tangible. 80 This type of fraud, impersonation of officers, would
clearly cause harm in the aggregate, but such harm may not be
apparent in individual cases such as the Ramos-Arenas case. Thus,
likely in an effort to provide additional protections for speech, the
legislatures (both state and federal) have sometimes required the
courts to show that the false impersonator gained some benefit from

if harm cannot be identified in each particular circumstance. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. A:-.IN. §
14:133.2 (2011).
75. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 357--58 ( 1987), superseded by
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens argued that there
are "scores of. . examples of such schemes which, although not depriving anyone of money
or property, are clearly schemes to defraud." One example he gives is the fraud of "deceptive
seduction, ... [which] often includes no property or monetary loss.").
76. See supra notes 43~46 & 68 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 43-46 & 68 and accompanying text. The dissenters in the AlParez
denial of rehearing gave various examples of such misrepresentations. For example, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1015 (2006) prohibits "any false statement under oath, in any case, proceeding or matter
relating to ... naturalization, citizenship, or registry of aliens." There is no requirement in this
statute that the misrepresentations actually harm the naturalization and citizenship process, but
because there will almost always be an inherent harm when people make misrepresentations in
these matters, the statute is aimed at regulating traud and is thus not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny. 18 U.S.C. § lOIS; United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 684 (9th
Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing).
78. See supra note 76.
79. This point is illustrated in the Ramos-Arenas case described in Part III of this Note.
See supra notes 47~53 and accompanying text. See also sources cited supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
80. See United States v. Ramos-Arenas, 596 F.3d 783, 788 (lOth Cir. 2010).
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the misrepresentations. However, this is a requirement that
legislatures have added, not one that courts have demanded. 81
Therefore, for regulated speech to be classitled as fraud and thus
be strictly outside of First Amendment protection, that speech must
l) tit within the areas of perjury, falsitlcation, concealment, or
misrepresentation; 2) be made with the intent to deceive; and 3)
have the potential to effectuate some harm. However, it is also
important to note that just because a statute regulating fraudulent
speech might also regulate a small amount of speech not meeting
these criteria does not automatically make that statute
unconstitutional. Where such a statute is challenged under the
overbreadth doctrine, the Supreme Court requires that statute to be
substantially overbroad before it will be struck as facially
unconstitutional. 82
B. The Misrepresentations Prohibited Under the Stolen Valor Act

QualifY as Fraud
The Ninth Circuit should have upheld the SVA because it
regulates only fraudulent speech. Even if the SVA might regulate
some speech that is not fraudulent, Alvarez's speech was fraudulent,
and the number of possible unconstitutional applications of the SVA
to others is so miniscule that the SVA is not substantially
overbroad. 83
The SVA's prohibition against falsely claiming to have received
military honors clearly tits within Knauer)s broad detlnition of fraud
because such claims are easily classitled as misrepresentations. But, as
has been discussed, in order for a statute to truly only target fraud, it
must be narrowed enough that it prohibits only those
misrepresentations that are made with an intent to deceive and could
81. See, Ccff., sources cited supra note 63 and accompanying text. for example, in federal
perjury, an area of fraud governed by statute, the legislature requires no benefit to result from
the misrepresentations and the courts, deferring to the legislature's ability to define fraudulent
speech, have not imposed such a requirement. See, eg., sources cited supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
82. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,615 (1973).
83. As long as the SVA is interpreted to require an intent to deceive, then even in the
unlikely scenario where a person actually mistakenly believed he or she had been awarded a
medal of honor, that person would not be liable under the Act. See United States v. Alvarez,
617 F.3d 1198, 1235-41 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 638 f.3d 666
(9th Cir. 2011), cert.granted, 132 S. Ct. 457 (2011).
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potentially effectuate some harm. The speech prohibited by the SVA
also meets these requirements because false representations about
receiving military honors are presumptively made with knowledge of
their falsity (and thus with the requisite intent to deceive), and such
misrepresentations effectuate an inherent harm whenever made.
Even if the courts were to impose the additional requirement that
the speaker receive some benefit as a result of the misrepresentations
in order for the speech to be considered fraudulent, 84 the SVA still
would meet all the requirements because misrepresentations about
receiving military honors bring inherent benefits to the speaker.
Thus, the SVA regulates only fraud and therefore should not be
subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
First, the SVA only prohibits misrepresentations made with an
intent to deceive. Because representations about one's reception of
military honors are based on personal knowledge, courts can infer
that speakers who make such misrepresentations had full knowledge
that the representations were false. 85 Moreover, it is well established
that knowledge of a statement's falsity creates a presumption of
intent to deceive. Thus misrepresentations about one's reception of
military honors are presumptively made with the requisite intent to
deceive. 86 Because of the nature of these misrepresentations
prohibited by the SVA, which are presumably made with knowledge
of their falsity, the SVA inherently includes the requirement that
representations be made with the intent to deceive in order to fall
within the purview of the statute. Moreover, such a scienter
requirement should be read into the statute because courts should
"impose a saving interpretation of an otherwise unconstitutional
statute so long as it is 'fairly possible to interpret the statute in a
manner that renders it constitutionally valid."' 87 Even the majority in
Alvarez conceded that reading a scienter requirement into the
statute "might be reasonable since most people know the truth
about themselves, thereby permitting [the courts] to construe the
Act to require a knowing violation. " 88

84. Perhaps in order to further insulate possibly protected speech even though courts
have not previously done this when dealing with statutory fraud.
85. See supra notes 65~67.
86. Id.
87. Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1568 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,762 (1988)).
88. See Ah•arez, 617 f.3d at 1209.
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Second, misrepresentations about rece1vmg military honors
inherently harm the reputation and meaning of such honors, as well
as the recipients of those honors. In passing the SVA, Congress
found that "[tlraudulent claims surrounding the receipt of [military
honors] damage the reputation and meaning of such decorations and
medals." 89 Similarly, Judge Bybee argued in his Alvarez dissent that
the harm resulting from false representations about receiving military
honors "is surely self-evident. " 90 Such misrepresentations "not only
dishonor the decorations and medals themselves, but dilute the
select group of those who have earned the nation's gratitude for
their valor. " 91 Misrepresentations about military honors diminish the
value of those honors, and this diminished value has been recognized
as a real harm that should be prevented in other areas of the law,
such as trademark law. 92 Just as the law protects trademarks from
diminished value as a result of misuse, the law should similarly
protect the value of military honors from such harm.
When General George Washington created military awards he
expected that '"these gallant men who are thus distinguished will, on
all occasions, be treated with particular confidence and
consideration. "' 93 When listeners are deceived into believing that the
speaker has received military honors, they are tricked into bestowing
their confidence and respect on an undeserving individual. This type
of fraud is especially detrimental to society in situations similar to
that in Alvarez, where such misrepresentations are made in a political
context (such as during city council and board meetings) where
people are likely to be deciding who to side with on various issues,
who to put their confidence in to accomplish different tasks, and
who to vote for in future elections. Thus, lies about military honors

89. Stolen Valor Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat. 3266 (2006).
90. See AlJJarez, 617 F.3d at 1234 (Bybee,)., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. In the area of trademark law, Congress has passed-and the courts have upheldvarious laws that attempt to protect the value of trademarks from dilution by ensuring that
trademarks (or trademarks that appear too similar) are not used by other parties not owning
the trademarks. See, CB., 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537
u.s. 418 (2003).
93. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 457 (2011)
(No. 11·210), 2011 WL 3645396, at *3 (citing GENERAL ORDERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTO:-.'
ISSUED AT NEWBURGH ON THE HUDSON 35 (1782-1783) (Edward C. Boynton ed. 1909)
(1883)).
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have a particularly strong potential for harming the political process
as well as bringing harm to the individual listeners. 94 Just as
individualized harm may not be apparent in each instance of perjury,
harm may not always be apparent in each circumstance in which
people misrepresent themselves as having received military honors.
But because such misrepresentations will cause harm in the
aggregate, these misrepresentations should be considered fraudulent.
When dealing with statutory fraud, courts have only imposed the
requirement that misrepresentations bring some benefit to the
speaker when such a requirement was imposed by the legislature on a
particular type of fraud. 95 However, even if such a requirement is
implied, the SVA only prohibits misrepresentations that will result in
inherent benefits for the speakers. As the Government states in its
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Alvarez, "the government
intends that military honors should bestow a rare degree of prestige
on their bearers," and such honor is reserved "only for the most
deserving. " 96 When people falsely represent themselves as having
received such honors, they are stealing that rare degree of prestige,
valor, respect, deference and other intangible benefits to which they
are not entitlcd. 97 These benefits, though hard to quantity and prove,
are no less real and often are even greater than tangible benefits such

94. Some scholars have argued that all lies harm the individual listeners and human
autonomy because they impose a t(mn of "mental slavery" on the listeners. One scholar has
argued that "in one respect lying is worse than outright coercion, because it is more insidious:
the victim docs not even know that he or she has been taken over and is being manipulated. At
least in cases of outright coercion, the victim's mind is free." David A. Strauss, Persuasion,
Autonomy, and Freedom of lixpreJJ·ion, 91 COI.UM. L. REV. 334, 354 ( 1991 ). Clearly courts
cannot consider the mental harm to e\'ery individual listener as sufficient harm to classif)· a
misrepresentation as fraud because that would encompass almost all lies of any nature.
However, because of the prestige and reputation surrounding military honors in this society,
lies about military honors seem to pose an unusually great danger of manipulating and
"enslaving" the minds of listeners. Thus it seems that this argument should at least be
acknowledged when discussing the possible harms caused by such misrepresentations.
95. Sec, eJf., sources cited supra note RI.
96. See supra note 93, at *24 (citing Examination of Criteria ji1r A wards and
Decorations: Hearing BcjiJrc the Military Per.rrmncl Subeomm. of the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, XI (2006) (statement of Hon. Michael L. Dominguez,
Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense t(Jr Personnel and Readiness)). Though not
conclusive, it is worth noting that the very fact that there is a problem with people lying about
receiving milital)' honors seems to strengthen the assertion that such honors carry inherent
benefits.
97. Ironically, if it becomes legal to lie about having military honors then people may
likely lose the desire to do so because the inherent benefit that comes with being able to claim
membership in such an elite group will diminish.
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as money or property. 98 A price tag cannot be placed on being
respected and honored in a community. Moreover, such benefits are
gained at the expense of those who have received such honors. Once
this elite honor becomes diluted by ta.lse claims, those benefits will
no longer exist even for those who deserve them.
Therefore, the SVA is constitutional as applied to A.lvarez
because his misrepresentations were made with intent to deceive and
they resulted in harm and unearned benefits to A.lvarez. Even if no
harm can actually be shown, because the misrepresentations made by
A.lvarez had the potential to effectuate harm, this is sutiicient to
qualifY these misrepresentations as fraudulent. The SVA is also
constitutional on its face because it prohibits only fraudulent
misrepresentations and any possible overbreadth that exists is not
substantial.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the legislature is free to regulate fraudulent
misrepresentations without having to pass First Amendment scrutiny
because fraud is categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.
Speech should be considered fraudulent if it fits into the categories
of perjury, falsification, concealment, or misrepresentation and if the
speech is made with an intent to deceive and has the potential to
cause harm. The misrepresentations prohibited under the Stolen
Valor Act, including those in question in Alvarez, fultlll all of these
requirements; thus the SVA is constitutional.

Natali Wyson *

98. These benefits certainly seem at least as valuable as an elevated social status in the
eyes of one's girlfriend, which the Tenth Circuit considered sufficient to qualif)• as a
fraudulently gained bcnclit in the Ramos-Arenas case. See supra notes 47-53 and
accompanying text.
* T.D. candidate, April 2013, T. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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